Abstract
Introduction
This article argues that Articles 9-12 of the Treaty on European Union 1 provide a pro mising way to conceptualize and develop the democratic legitimation of
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democracy, neither utopian nor apologetic, has found its way into its founding treaty. 4 It can lead the way in conceiving and developing the democratic credentials not just of the EU, but of public authority beyond the state in general. Since comparison is a main avenue to insight, this article will present Articles 9-12 of the EU Treaty and show what can be learnt from them for international organizations. 5 This approach is likely to be criticized as eurocentric, because international democracy might be a specific European concern, and because it addresses the issue on the basis of the EU Treaty. This article is in fact written from a particular standpoint, situated in Germany in the year 2011. As such, it does not make categorical claims as to truth, nor does it consider alternative constructions to be false. Given the political, cultural, and ideological diversity in world society, any contribution that purports to be conceived as universal should be viewed with suspicion. This piece is meant as an intellectual contribution to the debate on global governance, in the context of which it will, it is hoped, be contested. It claims to be scientific, yet not because it falsifies other claims, but because of its internal coherence, the circumspection in which the legal material is presented, and the analytical potential of the concepts it offers for the understanding and the development of international law.
One might doubt if those Articles in the EU Treaty can be of any meaning for international organizations, since the EU is far more powerful and developed than any international organization. The core argument supporting comparison between the EU and international organizations rests on the assumption that the EU, like many international organizations, exercises public authority. 6 As the exercise of any public authority begs the question of its democratic justification, this is the basis of comparison. Of course, it would be extremely suspicious if this contribution arrived at the conclusion that international organizations need to emulate the EU in order to enhance their democratic credentials. That is not the objective of this article. It aims at a basic conceptual framework for addressing the issue of democracy in international institutions. To advance the understanding, interpretation, and development of individual organizations, this framework needs to be developed in light of their specificities. 7 Given their profound differences, this contribution remains 4 See also in a similar vein Habermas, 'The Crisis of the European Union in the Light of a Constitutionalization of International Law' (in this volume).
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EJIL 23 (2012), [315] [316] [317] [318] [319] [320] [321] [322] [323] [324] [325] [326] [327] [328] [329] [330] [331] [332] [333] [334] at a high level of abstraction, with all the limitations this entails. In this spirit, it will (2) sketch the difficult path from a political idea to positive law, (3) present the path-breaking conceptual innovation in EU law, (4) highlight the importance of parliamentary institutions, and (5) stress the importance of further instruments of accountability and responsiveness.
Historical Sketches
A The Road to Articles 9-12 EU Treaty
For many decades, European democracy was legally a non-issue, as international democracy remains for many scholars today. The focus of legal minds was rather on the rule of law. With regard to the latter, there was consensus ab initio that it should be applied directly to the acts of the supranational organs, i.e., that the Community needed its proper rule of law legitimacy. Mere indirect application, i.e., via the national officials participating in the European political process or implementing its result in the national sphere, was always considered insufficient. 8 By contrast, the postulate of democratic legitimation proper to the Community has been only a political request of European federalists. Until the 1990s, the view was held that supranational authority did not legally require a democratic legitimation of its own. 9 Then, a rapid development took place with two focal points: Union citizenship and the Union's organizational set-up.
10
The development from political demand for an independent democratic legitimation to legal principle has been arduous. Tellingly, even the 1976 Act introducing the election of the representatives of the Parliament by direct universal suffrage does not yet contain the term 'democracy'.
11 Beginning in the 1980s, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) very cautiously started to use the concept of democracy as a legal principle. 12 The Treaty of Maastricht then employed this term, although it mentions its
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relevance for the supranational level only in the fifth recital of the Preamble. 13 With Article F EU Treaty in the Maastricht version of 1992, democracy found its way into a Treaty provision -yet not addressing the Union, but rather with a view to the Member States' political systems. The leap was not made until the Treaty of Amsterdam of 1997, Article 6 EU of which laid down that the principle of democracy also applies to the Union. This internal constitutional development is buttressed by external provisions. Of particular importance are Article 3 of the first Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights in its interpretation by the European Court of Human Rights, 14 as well as -albeit less clearly -national provisions such as Article 23(1) German Basic Law. 15 Articles 9-12 EU Treaty (in the version of the Lisbon Treaty) need to be understood against this background. 16 These Articles are based on the main positions advanced in what is a 20-year-old debate, and succeed in bringing them into a forward looking synthesis, as will be shown in a moment. This synthesis has been elaborated in one of the most involved political processes that the European continent has ever seen, and its enactment has gone through very burdensome procedures, mostly constitutional amendment procedures. In the meantime, politicians and the public have been well aware of the importance of that Treaty, not least following the failure of the Constitutional Treaty of 2004. These provisions have also been the object of detailed judicial review. 17 Accordingly, there is much to be said for the view that the concept of democracy as laid down in these Articles enjoys the consent of the vast majority of European citizens. Granted, this consent applies only to Europe; it does not provide these Articles with authority beyond the EU. What it does, however, is to put them forward as a basis for further thought, since they provide the first concept of democracy for non-state institutions that has been elaborated in such a complex mode and has succeeded in being democratically endorsed.
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B The International Debate
Developing thoughts on the basis of Articles 9-12 EU Treaty for the debate on international democracy is further warranted by the fact that the European debate can be seen as an offspring of the broader and older international debate. 18 Since the first decades of the 20th century, proposals were presented which aimed at some form of global representative assembly. 19 Most important were theoretical proposals to establish a parliamentary assembly within the framework of the League of Nations, which never materialized. 20 The fall of the Berlin Wall gave renewed impetus to the debate on international democracy. First, given the apparent success of 'Western' constitutional ideas, vocal authors started proposing democracy as a principle of international law to which the law and practice of states have to conform. 21 Secondly, the fall of the Berlin Wall initiated an epoch of globalization and intense international activity. As international organizations became far more active, the conviction that their democratic legitimation was fully covered and secured by state consent began to erode. To the extent that they succeeded in establishing themselves as institutions of public authority that develop international law and that are involved in policy choices, functionalist narratives invoking common goals or values were increasingly challenged. They were no longer accepted as wholly satisfactory justifications for the activities of international organizations. 22 Abstract goals cannot justify concrete policy choices. As actors wielding public authority, their actions are increasingly seen as requiring a genuine mode of justification in light of the principle of democracy. Here lies the difference with respect to the earlier debate: whereas its proposals did not mainly address a possible legitimacy gap in international activity but rather aimed at furthering international federation, the contemporary proposals are propelled by the perception of some legitimatory insufficiency.
So far, this discussion has had few results in the general law of international institutions. However, various initiatives by civil society and international legal and policy experts have developed proposals for enhancing the democratic accountability of international institutions through institutional reforms and new legal approaches to 18 
A Viable Idea of Democracy for International Institutions
Upon first glance, it appears as if the fall of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the Soviet bloc settled all fundamental issues over the core contents of the principle of democracy. 24 There is broad consensus regarding the necessary requirements of a state in order to qualify as being democratic. International lawyers, 25 comparative lawyers, 26 as well as political and constitutional theorists 27 agree upon some elements deemed necessary: governmental personnel must ultimately derive their power from citizen-based elections that are general, equal, free, and periodic. Moreover, all public power has to be exercised in accordance with the rule of law and has to be restricted through a guaranteed possibility of a change in power. 28 Yet how should it be understood for public institutions beyond the state?
A The Concept of the EU Treaty
The uncertainty over how to understand the concept of democracy may be traced to contrasting understandings concerning the subject of democracy. 29 One still has to distinguish an understanding of democracy which takes as its starting point the people or the nation as a macro-subject (the holistic concept of democracy) from one which designates affected individuals as its point of reference (the individualistic concept of democracy). Against this background, the first important contribution of Articles 9-12 EU Treaty becomes apparent. A number of concepts which are prominent in national legal discourses on the concretization of the democracy principle can be discarded for the purpose of understanding democracy as pertaining to the Union. This is particularly true for the theory which understands democracy as being the rule of 'the people'. The concept 'people' is in fact reserved for the polities of the Member States: Article 1(2) EU Treaty. This suggests that the principle of democracy within the context of the Union must be concretized independently from the concept of 'people'. 30 The notion of citizenship serves as a convincing alternative and informs Article 9 EU Treaty. 31 Notwithstanding unfortunate paternalistic overtones, this provision clearly stands in the tradition of republican equality under the individualistic paradigm that reaches back to Kant and Hobbes. This individualistic understanding is confirmed by Title V of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which guarantees citizenship rights as individual rights. European democracy is to be conceived from the perspective of the individual citizens, as confirmed by Articles 10(2) and 14(2) EU Treaty. The jurisprudence of the ECJ, which strengthens the rights of European citizenship, fortifies a cornerstone of European democracy.
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Yet it would be a misunderstanding of the Union's principle of democracy to place only the individual Union citizen in the centre. The Union does not negate the democratic organization of citizens in and by the Member States. Thus, alongside the Union citizens, the Member States' democratically organized peoples are acting in the Union's decision-making process as organized associations. The Union's principle of democracy builds on these two elements: the current Treaties speak on the one hand of the peoples of the Member States, and on the other hand of the Union's citizens, insofar as the principle of democracy is at issue. The central elements which determine the Union's principle of democracy at this basic level are thus named. The Union rests on a dual structure of democratic legitimation: the totality of the Union's citizens and the peoples in the European Union as organized by their respective Member States' constitutions. 33 This conception can be seen clearly in Article 10(2) EU Treaty. Another lesson is that democracy beyond the state does not substitute, but complements, domestic forms; it is best conceived as 'multilevel'. This entails a further important element. Many theories of democracy put the rule of the majority and the fight between competing parties at the very heart of their understanding. 34 Westminster democracy is almost impossible to reconcile with a developed dual structure of democratic legitimation; this can already be deduced from states which are federal (Belgium, Canada, Germany, the US). Hence the rule of the majority cannot be the defining element of democracy in international settings. Democracy there can far better be conceptualized by theories centred on the search for broad consensus.
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This issue of consensus leads to the question: what is it all about? Some authors understand European democracy as a way of political self-determination. 36 As a matter of fact, the Union can be interpreted as an institution protecting Europeans from American, Chinese, or Russian hegemony. But this does not satisfy the notion of political self-determination. The notion of self-determination can then be understood, first, in the sense of individual self-determination. To interpret the complex procedures of the Union in this sense, however, exceeds conventional imagination, or at least that of the present author. Furthermore, such an understanding might encourage intolerance with the tendency to exclude renegades. The alternative is to interpret democracy as collective self-determination. This appears viable in a nation-state on the basis of a strong concept of nation. It is, however, not transposable to the European level, since exactly such a collective, such a form of political unity, such a 'We' is missing. The consequence of this conception can therefore only be to perceive the Union as currently not capable of democracy. Although this conclusion can certainly be argued theoretically, it is useless for legal doctrine since it is unable to give meaning to a term of positive law, the 'democracy' of Article 2 EU Treaty. Europeans who endorsed the Treaty hold a different understanding. Article 9 EU Treaty, read together with Articles 10 to 12 EU Treaty, suggests that the cornerstones of European democracy are civic equality and representation, supplemented with participation, deliberation, and control.
B Lessons for International Organizations
A first lesson from European law for the international debate is that democracy is conceptually possible beyond the confines of the nation state and without a 'people'. It shows, moreover, that this conceptual move can convince huge majorities. Hence, realizing a more legitimate global order does not require a global people, let alone a world state. 37 European law indicates the development of transnational and possibly cosmopolitan forms of democracy. They are centred on the individual 38 and aim at representation, participation, and deliberation to feed the citizens' values, interests, 35 For an overview see M.G. Schmidt, Demokratietheorien (4th edn, 2008) and convictions into international decisions, but not at grand schemes such as self-government. Even if such a concept of transnational and possibly cosmopolitan citizenship is theoretically and politically viable, one might doubt if it is meaningful in the context of legal thought. One could see it simply as a step too far and of no use for the understanding and development of the law as it stands today. Without a doubt, no legal text enshrines transnational or cosmopolitan citizenship. But this is not a prerequisite for legal concepts. A comparison with European integration is once more revealing. In the early 1960s, Hans Peter Ipsen coined the concept of the market citizen as an influential legal concept. 39 It builds on individual rights granted by non-state legal sources and upheld by supranational institutions. In this light, transnational or cosmopolitan citizenship appears as a feasible legal concept. In particular, human rights have been developed as standards that protect the individual against any form of public authority. 40 Even a proponent of a state-centric understanding of international law will not deny that contemporary international law goes far beyond what Kant thought essential for a ius cosmopoliticum. 41 Many see even further transformation. Christian Tomuschat, for example, states, 'States are no more than instruments whose inherent function it is to serve the interests of their citizens as legally expressed in human rights': 42 'the State [is] a unit at the service of the human beings for whom it is responsible'. 43 If one reads these developments in light of the EU experience, elements of a transnational and possibly cosmopolitan citizenship can be found in the law as it stands; it is not a utopian idea alien to the current legal world. 44 A critique of this approach might state that it transforms any human rights approach into one of transnational and possibly cosmopolitan citizenship. It makes in fact good sense to distinguish. Most human rights approaches are focussed on protecting the individual. The idea of transnational and possibly cosmopolitan citizenship builds on this, but goes a step further. As Habermas' critique of Ipsen's concept of market citizenship rightly points out, 45 citizenship should be conceived today as entailing a dimension of political participation. 46 But even such elements exist in international law. Many international rights, such as Articles 19, 21, 25 ICCPR, provide a space for political contestation and participation. Certainly, two elements dear to citizenship in the national context are missing: there is no defined group of citizens, no right of free movement, and there is no right to vote for international parliamentary assemblies. 47 But one needs to distinguish federal concepts of citizenship 48 from transnational or cosmopolitan concepts. Moreover, there is broad consensus that the thought on such new forms of democratic politicization should be open and experimental. For that reason, citizenship as a legal thought should not be made dependent on the legal creation of a group and direct elections, 49 but, more abstractly, on forms of inclusion. 50 Following the example of European Union law, transnational and possibly cosmopolitan citizenship can be used as legal concepts to analyse, interpret, and develop the law of international organizations, as well as for constructions of justification. This does not aim at substituting states, 51 but it can be an essential supplement. In fact, another lesson is to build on the dual structure of democratic legitimation. If the EU experience is of any use, democratic procedures at the international level are more likely to work if they are set out to supplement rather than substitute the democratic legitimation that is produced by domestic procedures. The experience of the European Union, where democratic legitimation is derived from direct elections by equal citizens (via the European Parliament) and indirectly through the peoples of the Member States (via the European Council and Council), exemplifies that different bases for legitimation can not only coexist, but can be mutually supportive. The democratic legitimation of supra-and international institutions needs to be conceived as composite and 'multilevel'. Accordingly, the democratic legitimation of international public authority can be improved by better parliamentary control of the executive, and perhaps national referenda on matters negotiated in international fora. 52 Secondly, legitimation can be derived more directly through institutional reforms at the international level, either through the establishment of international institutions of a parliamentary nature (see below), or through new forms of civic participation at the global level (see below). 53 At the heart of these approaches lie understandings of democracy focusing EJIL 23 (2012), 315-334 on participation and deliberation. In this context, enabling the participation of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) as exponents of international civil society is often advanced as possible compensation for the detachment of international processes from national parliamentary control. 54 Pragmatic reforms are therefore geared towards the development of decision-making systems of international organizations, which facilitate the participation of civil actors in international procedures and emphasize the need for transparent and accountable exercise of public authority in international politics. On the basis of Article 9 EU Treaty the idea of a transnational and possibly cosmopolitan citizenship can be conceived in a way to provide meaningful suggestions for interpretation and institutional change.
Democratic Representation in Supra-and International Settings A The Idea of Representation in Article 10 EU Treaty
The world owes to the Federalist Papers the idea that the principle of democracy finds its most important expression in representative institutions; 55 Article 10(1) EU Treaty builds on this. Almost 20 years of discussion have revealed that parliamentarianism is without an alternative for the EU but has to be adapted to its specific needs. In accordance with the basic premise of dual legitimation, elections provide two lines of democratic legitimation. These lines are institutionally represented by the European Parliament, which is based on elections by the totality of the Union's citizens, and by the Council and the European Council, whose legitimation is based on the Member States' democratically organized peoples: see Article 10(2) EU Treaty. In the current constitutional situation, the line of legitimation from the national parliaments is clearly dominant, as shown in particular by Article 48 EU Treaty and by the preponderance of the Council and the European Council in the Union's procedures. Viewed in this light, one understands the Treaty of Lisbon as positing requirements for national parliaments in Article 12 EU Treaty.
The implications of this scheme are enormous. A transnational parliament can confer democratic legitimation although it does not represent a people or a nation and does not fully live up to the principle of electoral equality. 56 Moreover, a governmental institution is also able to do so. This contrasts sharply with national constitutional law. Even in federal constitutions, the representative institutions of sub-national governments are rarely acknowledged to have a role in conferring democratic legitimation. 57 The idea of a unitary people is too strong. By contrast, European executive federalism has its own democratic significance in light of the Union's democracy principle.
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B Representation in International Organizations
The recent intellectual revival of concepts of global parliamentarianism can -as was the case in the EU -be interpreted as a reaction to the perceived limits of democratic legitimation derived solely from the representation of Member States in international organizations. 59 In comparison to the EU, however, the legitimation question is even more acute in international organizations, as many governmental representatives fulfil their roles in the organization on behalf of autocratic regimes which do not represent their peoples. 60 In any event, executive decision-making in intergovernmental organizations is increasingly criticized in light of its scarce democratic input. 61 Calls for international parliamentary bodies in the international legal debate are by no means a new phenomenon. The first differentiated debates can be traced back to the time of World War I and the interwar period, during which a number of renowned international lawyers proposed to create global parliamentary bodies in order to add a further layer of legitimation to international decision-making processes. 62 Hitherto, two basic conceptions have dominated the debates about the composition of such international parliamentary bodies. According to the first model, a global parliament is supposed to consist of representatives from national parliaments. The Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) is often seen as a potential precursor to such a form of transnational parliamentary assembly -a universal parliament of parliaments. 63 Sectoral examples of this kind of international parliamentarianism can be found in the parliamentary assemblies of existing international organizations, such as the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the MERCOSUR Parliament, the Pan-African Parliament of the African Union, the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Assembly, or the parliamentary assemblies of NATO, the Council of Europe, and the OSCE. 64 In this version of international parliamentarianism, national elections remain the source of democratic legitimation.
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EJIL 23 (2012), [315] [316] [317] [318] [319] [320] [321] [322] [323] [324] [325] [326] [327] [328] [329] [330] [331] [332] [333] [334] Here, the source of legitimation is ultimately identical to that claimed by national governmental representatives when acting within international institutions. 65 To what extent can they provide additional democratic legitimation? The elements for answering this question are laid down in Article 11 EU Treaty. If such assemblies operate in a transparent and deliberative way embedded in and responsive to the affected publics, the argument can be made that they can generate democratic legitimation proper. This finds a cautious expression in the election of judges to the ECtHR by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.
66 Ever since 1998, interviews with candidates by a sub-committee have also borne the potential of nourishing the development of a public that further increases the legitimatory momentum. This procedural element has, for example, triggered a positive politicization of the election process when the assembly rejected a Member State's list of candidates because it did not include any female candidate.
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The second scenario envisages a parliamentary body consisting of members who either represent civil society organizations or are directly elected in innovative global election procedures by individual human beings. This form of assembly, of which the European Parliament is so far the only existing -albeit regional -emanation, certainly is the more ambitious one. It was re-launched in the mid-1990s, around the 50th anniversary of the United Nations, in various political circles. 68 As to the international legal debate, Richard Falk and Andrew Strauss in 2000 called for a 'Global Peoples' Assembly' with directly elected representatives. 69 In their view, the elections for the assembly could as a first step be organized on an informal basis by a coalition of NGOs and like-minded states, without the blessing of the state-dominated system of international law. Once the established global assembly had assumed an influential political role in world politics, it could be legally institutionalized on the basis of a multilateral treaty.
In order to counter the argument that a global parliament would either be dominated by few populous countries or grow to an unworkable size, many different apportionment formulae have been developed since the late 1990s. Most of them rely on the size of the population of a particular country and use complex mathematical calculations and the principle of degressive proportionality. Thus, they advance solutions to the problem of representation of all citizens of the planet without marginalizing or excluding any region or country of the world. Since a number of the apportionment models under discussion manage to mitigate this problem to some extent, they make democratic representation through a global parliament at least theoretically possible. 70 According to one of the models proposed by the NGO 'Committee for a Democratic UN', which takes the world's nation states as a starting point for a (degressive) proportional apportionment, the global parliament thus created would consist of 365 members, of whom China would have 86 representatives, the United States 21, Germany 7, and Tuvalu 2. 71 The question of what the functions and competences of such a global parliament should look like seems to have attracted somewhat less attention than the question of its legitimizing value. Proposals range from full-scale global legislation to watchdog and veto functions for (other) organs. One of the more innovative proposals constructs a role for a global parliament in deciding controversial legal issues, such as conflicts between international human rights law and international economic law. 72 The question remains what proposals can gain the necessary political momentum eventually to add a further layer of legitimation to international institutions. Following the tradition of progressive internationalism, some experimentalism should be welcomed. Granted, there is no certainty as to how to increase democratic representation within international organizations. For that reason, softlaw instruments should be used in order to test ideas and stop experiments which, after testing, fail to convince. The provisions in Articles 9-12 EU Treaty, however, show on which conceptual basis and in which direction experiments should be undertaken. affected, deliberation, and flexibility. 74 Participation and deliberation can inform the elaboration of decisions in a variety of ways. The transparency of public action, that is its comprehensibility and the possibility of attributing accountability, is essential. European constitutional law places itself at the forefront of constitutional development when it requires that decisions be 'taken as openly as possible', i.e., transparently. The specifically democratic meaning of transparency in European law is confirmed by Article 11(1) and (2) EU Treaty.
Transparency requires knowledge of the motives. From the beginning, what was once called Community law has enshrined a duty to provide reasons even for legislative acts (Article 296 TFEU), something which is hardly known in national legal orders. This duty was first conceived primarily from the perspective of the rule of law, 75 yet its relevance for the principle of democracy has meanwhile come to enjoy general acknowledgement. 76 Access to documents, laid down in primary law in Article 15 TFEU and Article 42 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, is also of great importance to the realization of transparency. It has further become the subject of a considerable body of case law. 77 Another aspect is the openness of the Council's voting record on legislative measures: Article 16(8) EU Treaty. 78 The second complex concerns forms of political participation beyond elections. Popular consultations appear to be an obvious instrument, and referenda have occasionally been used to legitimize national decisions on European issues (such as accession to the Union or the ratification of amending Treaties). Extending such instruments to the European level has been proposed for some time. 79 The restrictively designed citizens' initiative of the Treaty of Lisbon (Article 11(4) EU Treaty) falls short of this, but nevertheless shows some potential. 80 Whereas the Union has no experience with popular consultations, it has a lot of experience in allowing individual interests to intervene in the political process. Article 11(2) EU Treaty is based on an understanding that such participation of interested and affected parties might be a further avenue to realizing the democratic principle. 81 However, the principle of political equality must be respected, and participation has to be designed so as to avoid political gridlock or the so-called agency capture by strong, organized groups.
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EJIL 23 (2012), 315-334 ensure transparency, knowledge of motives, and the participation of affected individuals is thought to promote accountable and hence democratic governance at the supranational level. 89 This conceptual framework allows for tapping extensively into the European experience. In this light, the EU, the OECD, the WHO, and the WTO are conceived akin to US regulatory agencies.
The comprehensive discourse about enhancing the legitimation of the exercise of public authority beyond the nation state provides a rich repertory of concepts and principles, wherein transparency and participation can be considered key factors for alleviating the perceived democratic deficit and holding international institutions to account. 90 Transparency is fundamental to informed civic participation as a potential source of legitimation, as it means providing access to information and opening up decision-making processes and procedures to public scrutiny. 91 Many international organizations have already responded to the mounting criticism of secretiveness by adopting disclosure policies. 92 Recently, the World Bank released a revised policy on access to information which was developed in close collaboration with civil society organizations, established clear request mechanisms, and opened up new categories of routinely disclosed information to the general public. 93 In this context, the idea of representation of affected interests of individuals in or vis-à-vis international institutions through NGOs has become an important strand in conceptualizing more legitimate rule-making and enforcement at the international level. Two political developments in the 1990s triggered the conceptual focus on NGO participation. First, the successful role of NGOs in international treaty making, for instance in the Ottawa process to ban landmines and in the elaboration of the Rome Statute, and, secondly, the critical role NGO networks assumed in organizing protests against political projects run by international economic institutions, such as the OECD in the context of the multilateral investment treaty project and the WTO. 94 Based on these developments, the power of a globally operating civil society to politicize international institutions has been identified by many authors as a potential source of democratic legitimation, 95 be it through processes of scandalization 96 or through
